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I Introduction
In 1837, following his famous trip to the Galapagos islands, Charles Darwin
sketched in his notebook1 a rough tree to describe how different species might be
related to one another.2 This ‘tree of life’ was not the first metaphor Darwin played
with—he first played with the image of coral, growing over time as new polyps
grew on the remains of old ones. Nor did he pull it out of thin air—the tree of life
was an already well-known image from the Bible and Aristotle, sometimes used to
describe a ‘ladder of nature’ or ‘great chain of being’ linking inanimate objects like
rocks through insects to higher-level beings and sometimes, to angels and God.
But Darwin’s ‘tree of life’ metaphor, eventually published between pages 116 and
117 of his 1859 On the Origin of Species, was the one that stuck, in no small part
because, repurposed, it evocatively described the process of evolution through natural selection that he had discovered. For the past century and a half, that metaphor became the structure guiding work in evolutionary sciences. Placing species
on the tree, first through careful anatomical analysis and then through DNA evidence, was a core intellectual endeavour—until the discovery of horizontal gene
transfer. The increasing recognition that DNA often jumped from bacteria and viruses into other species, including humans, and that the boundaries between species and even kingdoms are far more permeable than understood, hacked away at
the idea that life had evolved in an ever-branching upward direction. But the tree of
life metaphor did not go away, as researchers sought to reconcile their findings to it,
drawing different root structures, tangling branches, or bushes. The metaphor that
had helped push science forward for so long had begun to get in its way.
Metaphors are part of international law’s scaffolding.3 They provide a language to
describe and convey the law’s operation, they help international lawyers identify
*
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Known now as ‘Transmutation Notebook B’.
2 The discussion in this paragraph is derived from David Quammen, The Tangled Tree: A Radical
New History of Life (Simon & Schuster 2018).
3 Writing about metaphors in international law, one is faced with a choice: (1) to try as best as possible to use a spare, clinical language, avoiding metaphors in the discussion to better highlight the
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legal subjects and categorize situations in doctrinal categories, and they provide
normative justifications for the law. Part of their shared cognitive system, metaphors allow international lawyers to build a shared, tangible universe of legal
meaning. In so doing, however, metaphors also help hide international law’s dark
side, blind international lawyers to alternative ways of organizing the world, and
prejudge legal outcomes.
Sometimes obvious, sometimes obscured, metaphor’s role as architecture remains largely invisible.4 This chapter seeks to unveil5 the hidden structures metaphors support. Section II thus explores three levels at which metaphor operates—(1)
Law as Metaphor, (2) Law’s Metaphors, and (3) Metaphor as Narrative—through
specific examples—naturalistic metaphors for customary international law, international ‘personality’, the contested nature of the internet, and liberalized trade’s
role in ‘raising all boats’ or ‘growing the pie’. As will become obvious, these three
levels, while distinguishable, are not hermetically sealed. A single metaphor may
operate at multiple of these levels at the same time, explaining, categorizing, and/
or justifying legal phenomena. Section III revisits the role metaphors play in each
and across these examples, describing how metaphors reify international law and
its community of practitioners, both as an imagined utopia and a dark and forbidding fortress.6
That metaphors are important to law will surprise no one. Metaphors are first
and foremost thought of as figures of speech, rhetorical tools suggesting an implicit
analogy between one object and another.7 Webster’s dictionary, for example, defines a metaphor as a ‘figure of speech containing an implied comparison, in which
a word or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied to another’.8
For lawyers, focused on how words are used to persuade, to rationalize, or to justify, the power of such tools is obvious. Metaphors are, as will be discussed more
below, arguments in miniature—ways of describing why a particular actor, object,
specific roles metaphors play [Ha! Couldn’t even do it there. Now you’re picturing sterile white rooms
and lab coats.], or (2) to turn into the skid, embracing the metaphors at every turn, highlighting their
ubiquity and variety, success and failure. The latter, at least, seems more fun.
4 See Andrea Bianchi and Moshe Hirsch, ‘International Law’s Invisible Frames: Introductory
Insights’ in this volume 7–12 (discussing the invisibility of these cognitive frames and its consequences). As they explain, one ‘noticeable feature that social cognition and knowledge production share
is that they are often invisible processes that take place without us being fully aware that they are at play’.
ibid 6–7.
5 See ibid 13.
6 In their introductory chapter, Bianchi and Hirsch explain that their goal for the volume is to ‘unveil’, ‘understand’, and ‘unlearn’ the cognitive biases that currently frame and structure international
law. ibid. Section II of this chapter is primarily concerned with the first two; section III begins to tackle
the third.
7 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘metaphor’ as ‘a figure of speech in which a word or
phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness
or analogy between them (as in drowning in money)’. See ‘metaphor, n’ (Merriam-Webster Online)
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metaphor (accessed 2 December 2020).
8 Webster’s New World Dictionary (3rd College edn, 1988) 852.
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or situation deserves to be treated a certain way.9 It is thus unsurprising that judicial
opinions, briefs, and scholarly articles are replete with metaphors, some hackneyed
and clichéd, others fresh and interesting, and still others disastrous failures.10
But metaphors’ impact reach far deeper than mere rhetoric, as the three linked
metaphors in this sentence demonstrate. They are deeply woven into our language
as a means for describing real and abstract ideas. They ‘help decipher what might
be difficult to understand otherwise’.11 And while some of these metaphors may
have lost their full imaginative bite—we rarely think about what it means to ‘grasp’
an idea (and as such may be thought of as a ‘dead’ metaphor), others continue to
have force, bringing with them chains of associations that shape how we talk about
and conceive of a particular thing, person, or idea. As Thomas Ross observed, lawyers ‘live in a magical world of law where liens float, corporations reside, minds
hold meetings, and promises run with the land. The constitutional landscape is
dotted with streams, walls, and poisonous trees. And these wonderful things are
cradled in the seamless web of law’.12 At some level, this is unsurprising. Legal rules
are abstract ideas. They have no physical form. While legal rules may inspire or
motivate physical actions, they do not take them themselves. Metaphors are necessary in order to describe their operation and application. Entirely mental processes of determining proportionality are described and shared as ‘balancing’ or
‘weighing’.13
And deeper still we go. Some have suggested that all language, perhaps even all
cognition is metaphorical.14 In fact, following up on the seminal15 work of George
9 Macmillan’s dictionary, for example, defines a ‘metaphor’ as ‘a word or phrase that means one thing
and is used for referring to another thing in order to emphasize their similar qualities’. See ‘metaphor,
n’ (Macmillan dictionary) https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/metaphor
(accessed 2 December 2020). See also Jonathan H Blavin and I Glenn Cohen, ‘Gore, Gibson, and
Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary’ (2002) 16 Harvard Journal
of Law & Technology 265, 266.
10 What perhaps is more surprising is how little legal literature there is on the role of metaphors.
Certainly, there are pieces looking at the role of particularly prominent metaphors in, for example, US
constitutional law see eg Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions (Southern Illinois
University Press 1992) 37, and some of the most prominent legal scholars, among others, have dabbled
with the issue. See eg Cass R Sunstein, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741;
Richard Posner, Law and Literature (Harvard University Press 1988). But deep theorizing about the role
of metaphor remains on the fringe of legal discourse. Perhaps digging too deeply reveals uncomfortable
truths about the work metaphors do standing in for reasoned arguments and holding a legal community together.
11 Bianchi and Hirsch (n 4) 6.
12 Thomas Ross, ‘Metaphor and Paradox’ (1989) 23 Georgia Law Review 1053, 1053.
13 See eg Michael R Smith, ‘Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing’ (2007) 58 Mercer Law
Review 919, 928. For an explanation of the cognitive origins of such legal metaphors, including the ways
human physical experience is transposed to legal analysis see Jacob Livingston Slosser and Mikael Rask
Madsen, ‘Institutionally Embodied Law: Cognitive Linguistics and the Making of International Law’ in
this volume.
14 David E Leary, ‘Psyche’s Muse: The Role of Metaphor in the History of Psychology’ in David E
Leary (ed), Metaphors in the History of Psychology (CUP 1990) (‘All knowledge is ultimately rooted in
metaphorical (or analogical) modes of perception and thought’).
15 A metaphor perhaps better left dead?
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Lakoff and Mark Johnson,16 metaphors have widely been reconceived not merely
as figures of speech but as figures of thought.17 ‘[M]etaphor is not merely a figure of
speech, but is a specific mental mapping that influences a good deal of how people
think, reason, and imagine in everyday life.’18 And work in the cognitive sciences
has built on these insights to develop models to describe how a ‘source domain’
(the object of the comparison) is linked to a more familiar ‘target’ domain through
specific mental pathways.19
This makes the task of writing about metaphors in international law quite
daunting. Metaphors suffuse the language of international law, operating (1) at the
level of language and cognition itself, (2) as general descriptions of law’s operation,
(3) as more specific descriptions of international law’s development, (4) as doctrinal frames and cues, and (5) as normative narratives underpinning the law’s desirability or morality. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of writing about metaphors
in international law is thus deciding the level at which to situate the investigation.
Lost in the mysteries of the deep, directions back to the surface become difficult to
discern.
For this chapter, I have chosen to focus on the third, fourth, and fifth levels.20
At these levels, the role of international law, both as an object of metaphors and in
choosing metaphors becomes more distinct. As such, it is also at these levels that
metaphors’ roles in creating a community of practice become more apparent—
creating shared languages of the law, shaping legal categories, defining orthodox
and unorthodox views. It also allows us to explore how metaphors can be both
useful and dangerous in their operation within international law.21
16 George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’ in Andrew Ortony (ed), Metaphor and
Thought (CUP 1993) 202–203; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1st edn,
University of Chicago Press 1980) 3.
17 Steven L Winter, ‘What is the “Color” of Law?’ in Raymond W Gibbs Jr (ed), The Cambridge
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (CUP 2008) 368; George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More Than Cool
Reason: A Field Guide To Poetic Metaphor (University of Chicago Press 1989) xi.
18 Raymond W Gibbs Jr, ‘Taking Metaphor Out of Our Heads and Putting it into the Cultural World’
in Raymond W Gibbs Jr. and Gerard J Steen (eds), Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics (John Benjamin
Publishing Company 1997) 145.
19 See eg discussion in Stephanie A Gore, ‘A Rose by any other Name: Judicial Use of Metaphors for
New Technologies’ (2003) 2 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy 403.
20 Drawing on the cognitive sciences, Jacob Livingston Slosser has done pathbreaking work at the
nexus between the first two levels, exploring how the framing of rights impacts decisions regarding
their potential violation. Jacob Livingston Slosser, ‘Interpreting the “Quality of Law” at the European
Court of Human Rights: Metaphorical Framing and Evaluative Judgment’ (2018) iCourts Working
Paper Series, No 143 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251277 (accessed 7 May 2020). Slosser continues that
work in his chapter here with Mikael Rask Madsen. Together, they explore the lessons of cognitive linguistics for international law generally and the European Court of Human Rights’ articulation of the
margin of appreciation doctrine specifically. See Slosser and Madsen (n 13).
21 Although some work on the cognitive science of metaphors distinguishes between the mental processes (and meaning) of metaphors and similes, much like the posters in an elementary school classroom see eg Sam Glucksberg, ‘How Metaphors Create Categories: Quickly’ in Raymond W Gibbs Jr
(ed), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (CUP 2008) 74–76, international law’s
common, shared imagery take varied linguistic form depending on context, and I purposely use a more
inclusive definition.
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II International Law’s Metaphors
A Law as Metaphor
1 ‘Natural’ laws
What is customary international law, and how does it develop? This is, of course,
one of the thorniest questions in international law. International lawyers have little
difficulty identifying a sort-of international conventional wisdom on acceptable
or unacceptable behaviour. But the contestable instincts of international lawyers
are hardly a solid base for legal obligations. Visible, describable instances of state
practice thus become key to grounding any argument for customary international
law. But those too are merely snapshots of practice, incapable of proving in-and-of
themselves the presence of a generalizable rule. When a practice evidences a legal
obligation as opposed to something else remains as elusive as the rule itself. The
jurisgenerative process remains more a theory than an observable phenomenon.
Enter metaphors. In order to explain and justify this unseen process, international lawyers have often turned to natural phenomena.22 Sometimes these metaphors are organic. Customary international law rules grow, ripen,23 or evolve.24
Other times, they sound in geology. Rules crystallize25; practices accrete26; norms
are slowly deposited into a sediment27 of international law. The metaphors are logical and evocative, providing simple and persuasive visuals of how a seed of an

22 For a deeper dive into metaphors of ripening and crystallizing and customary international law see
Maks Del Mar, ‘Metaphor in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry’ (2017)
86 Nordic Journal of International Law 170, 186–95.
23 See eg Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116; Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK
and Northern Ireland v Iceland) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 3; The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 686
(1900) (‘By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago and gradually ripening
into a rule of international law’).
24 See eg Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (Judgment)
[2012] ICJ Rep 99, 292.
25 See eg North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 [69]; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic
of Germany v Iceland) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 175; Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Declaration) [1985] ICJ Rep 13; Case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 95; Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 292.
26 See eg Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, 435, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Sir Garfield Barwick (‘It cannot be doubted that customary law is subject to growth and to accretion as international opinion changes and hardens into law’).
27 See eg Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v UK) (Judgment) [2016] ICJ Rep 834, 991 (Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cançado Trindade) (‘There is an opinio juris communis to this effect, sedimented during recent
decades, and evidenced in the successive establishment, in distinct continents, of nuclear-weapon-free
zones, and nowadays in the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’); Philip
Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 31, 342
(‘Customary international law is the legal form of the sedimentary self-ordering of a self-evolving international society’).
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idea might grow into full-fledged rule. It is no surprise that they have had such
staying force in international legal discourse and decisions.
But as obvious as those metaphors may seem, they are far from neutral. For one
thing, they are used in ways that portray customary international law in largely
positive and progressive terms. Rules are fruits or gems. Adaptations help rules
survive and match their environments.28 Rarely are the metaphors turned on their
heads to reveal the dark sides of these processes. We seldom speak of rules spoiling
or growing rotten,29 metastasizing or collecting barnacles, producing eruptions or
earthquakes.
More importantly, these metaphors obscure the agency behind these developments. Relying on natural phenomena gives customary international law rules an
aura of inevitability. Missing are the states and other actors whose concerted actions and reactions over time helped push the rule in one direction or another.
Missing, in others words, is power.
Custom could easily be described as a battlefield. Customary international
law is a contest in which particular international rules confer specific benefits to
particular actors.30 Combatants make moves and countermoves aimed at protecting, shoring up, and conquering territory and position within a field of rules.
Consensus over customary international law is less recognition than acquiescence.
Rules about territory and obligation favour older powers over newly liberated ones.
Rules of armed conflict often favour the weaponry and tactics of powerful states.
Rules regarding nationalization protect wealthy state investors rather than developing state publics. To the extent those rules have shifted, it has been the result of
sustained opposition.
Self-defence against non-state actors is a current battleground for custom. While
one group of states asserts a customary international law rule supporting their
military efforts in states ‘unwilling or unable’ to counter non-state actor threats
emanating from within their borders, another group of states, many of them more
likely to face such unwilling or unable claims, rails against it.31 The first set of states
asserts their interpretation through military actions and justifications; the latter

28 As Antony Anghie explains of the ‘natural selection’ metaphor: ‘Species evolved over time; but
whatever the nature of the changes, they took place in accordance with the fundamental laws that
had been identified by Darwin. Ideas of progress and evolution were embodied in international law
thinking, and biological metaphors were often used by international lawyers.’ Antony Anghie, ‘Finding
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’ (1999) 40
Harvard International Law Journal 1, 20 n 6.
29 See eg Maurice H Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law (Martinus Nijhoff
1998) 176 (explaining of custom that ‘we are more interested in knowing, when we bite it, if it is now
ripe or still too hard or sour’).
30 See eg Timothy Meyer, ‘Codifying Custom’ (2012) 160 Pennsylvania Law Review 995 (for such an
account).
31 See eg Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Specially-
Affected States and the Formation of Custom’ (2018) 112
American Journal of International Law 191.
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through protests and votes. While the first asserts crystallization of a permissive
rule,32 the second focuses on state ‘acts’ in violation of existing rules.33
These blind spots, while perhaps easy to ignore, are likely not accidental. For
international lawyers as whole, the naturalistic metaphors provide a shared club
language that reinforces their self-perception as disinterested scientists.34 It also
serves to immunize their techniques from external critiques that custom is nothing
more than power-politics reified. But these blind spots are also ways to obscure the
role of power within the club, to reify status, and defend the mainstream against its
critics.

2 Person-ality
The ur-metaphor35 of international law is the equation of states with persons.
The metaphor stands at the centre of international law doctrine, explaining and
justifying a suite of basic rules and assumptions about how the system operates.
States, like persons, are the natural holders of international legal personality. States
have rights, duties, and immunities, and can make contracts and claims. Others
may have such powers, but only because states, the natural persons of international
law, bestow or delegate them. Sovereign equality recognizes that states, like persons, are equal before the law.
Although the analogy goes back at least as far as Hobbes, who imagined states
living in the state of nature that individuals had succeeded in transcending,36 the
analogy takes on particular force in the shift from the ‘law of nations’ to ‘international law’, creating frameworks that filtered out the variety of legal actors and
legal forms that characterized the former, distilling the system down into its state-
and consent-focused form.
But the metaphor is far more pervasive. When we talk about global affairs, we
speak of states (rather than their leaders) acting, thinking, and believing.37 We talk
about states’ bodies—they act through an ‘arm’ of the state and sub-state units are
described as ‘organs’. Most of all, the analogy between states and persons has reified the state as a ‘natural’ unit of international relations. Like persons, we perceive

32 See eg Michael P Scharf, ‘How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law’ (2016) 48 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15, 65–66 (identifying when a rule permitting self-defence
against non-state actors ‘crystallized’).
33 Heller (n 31) 211–12.
34 The effect is particularly pronounced when these metaphors are translated into other languages.
35 The prefix ‘ur-’, meaning primitive, primordial, original, has its origins in German, but nonetheless
seems to metaphorically invoke the image of the ancient city of Ur and, with it, an imagined origin of
civilization. An interesting false metaphor, perhaps.
36 See eg Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed, first published 1651, CUP 1991) 244 (‘[T]he
Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in
procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring his own safety’).
37 Game theoretic models of international relations provide an interesting corollary, imagining states
a rational ‘actors’. In the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, states are reduced to petty criminals, eager to stay out
of jail.
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states’ bodies to be inviolable,38 condemning violations of state boundaries, and
indivisible, recoiling at attempts at amputations39 or at their vivisection. The metaphor has both internal and external facing implications. Internally, the state was
made up of the ‘body politic’.40 Externally, the state could be part of an international
society or a ‘family’ of nations. There is a dark side to this metaphor, however. As
Antony Anghie observes, the analogy of states and persons, while perhaps now
a source for notions of sovereign equality, was once used to deny access to non-
Europeans.41 Characterizations of persons as barbaric or civilized were transposed
to groups; such civilized groups—states—were defined by their ‘family’ resemblance to European states, and only such civilized groups were worthy of membership in the family of nations of international society.42
The state-personhood metaphor thus obscures the messy mix of dissonant
voices within states, the range of transnational actors for whom state boundaries
have little meaning, the plural, overlapping legal communities in which people live,
and the contingent, contested nature of current state borders. It valorizes and empowers those who gain control of the state’s mouthpiece over all other groups, regardless of their on-the-ground authority.
When non-state actors do need to be conceptualized, the personification of the
state creates a metaphorical baseline. As Natasha Wheatley explains: ‘Metaphors
can function as a mental tunnel between the known and the unknown.’43
International organizations, for example, are described as living creatures birthed
or created by states.44 Andrew Guzman’s invocation of Frankenstein’s monster as a
metaphor for international organizations is notable in this regard for its description of international organizations not only as artificial persons, but as imperfect
38 See eg Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) (‘The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable’).
39 Dissenting from the ICJ’s Kosovo Advisory opinion, for example, Judge Koroma condemns the
unilateral declaration of independence as an attempt to ‘dismember or amputate part of the territory
of a State Kosovo’ in violation of international law. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 404, 475,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma. See also Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12,
Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard; Case concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/
Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6; Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar And Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 149, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, and Koroma.
40 See eg Note, ‘Organic and Mechanical Metaphors in late Eighteenth-Century American Political
Thought’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 1832, 1841–42.
41 See generally Anghie (n 28).
42 ibid 28–29.
43 Natasha Wheatley, ‘Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not
Being a State’ (2017) 35 Law and History Review 753, 764.
44 See eg Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of
Modern States (OUP 2017) (describing International Organizations as ‘organic’ or ‘living’ creatures);
David J Bederman, ‘The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at
Cape Spartel’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 275 (international organizations described
as ‘organisms’, ‘creatures’, ‘living’, and ‘evolving’).
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simulacrums and dangerous experiments.45 Not quite persons, international organizations become different creatures, divergent forms of life. Other non-state
actors are described as a veritable menagerie of pseudo-persons. Natasha Wheatley
brilliantly disinters the varied beings conjured during the interwar period as metaphors for minorities, League of Nations Mandates, and other holders of partial
personality.46 Embryos, slaves, and specters—‘familiar genres of incomplete or
deficient personhood’—suddenly populated a diversifying imaginary.47 The creativity of interwar international lawyers though actually underlines their conservatism. All new developments had to be understood through the ur-metaphor of
states as persons.

B Law’s Metaphors
At a second level, metaphors help define legal categories. Categorization is a key first
step in applying the law to a situation. Real-world situations are messy; facts need to
be sifted to determine whether an issue sounds in contract or tort, nuisance or crime.
That categorization process is itself metaphorical. A messy real-world situation is described in terms of its similarity to a legal-world ideal type. Does the story most resemble that of a spurned business partner, a car accident, a loud party, or a burglarized
home? Is a treaty a contract, legislation, or a constitution? In common-law systems,
this type of legal reasoning is not only obvious, but valued. Civil law systems might
disavow the most robust versions of this reasoning in favour of the code’s greater precision (though the code itself may exhibit such reasoning), but some version of this
reasoning is the inevitable product of fitting life’s infinite variety into the law’s more
finite cognition. And to the extent that lawyers share a normative commitment to
treating like cases alike, comparisons with categorized cases are unavoidable.
The force of such doctrinal metaphors is particularly pronounced in international law, where a smaller group of subspecialities has long dominated the field.
Categorizing an issue as one of trade or investment, environment or human rights,
armed conflict or resource management, brings a whole suite of special assumptions and rules.48 Categorizing an issue tells us which codebook to take down from

45 Andrew Guzman, ‘International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem’ (2013) 24 European
Journal of International Law 999.
46 Wheatley (n 43).
47 As Wheatley recounts, Hersch Lauterpacht appealed to international law’s rogues gallery for analogies: ‘When we wish to refute the orthodox view of States only being the subjects of international law,
we have to fall back upon such exotic examples as pirates, blockade runners, carriers of contraband,
recognized belligerents, and so on.’ Wheatley (n 43) 756 (quoting Lauterpacht).
48 Affordable medicines might be a question of human rights or of trade. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano
and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of
Global Law’ (2004) 5 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1024–32. Tuna might be framed as
a food resource or as an endangered species. See Margaret A Young, ‘Protecting Endangered Marine
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our mental shelf. Necessity and proportionality, for example, have defined meanings special to jus ad bellum and jus in bello, human rights, or investment.

1 Contesting cyberspace
Making activity on the internet legally cognizable exemplifies the need for and
power of such doctrinal metaphors.49 As Molly Sauter has observed:
The use of conceptual metaphors in the construction and implementation of
internet policy is extremely attractive, given the black-boxed, complex nature
of technological systems up to this point. Many people have no way of speaking
about network communications technologies at the high level needed for policy
development without the use of metaphors.50

As such, internet metaphors abound: ‘the “information super highway”, a “series
of tubes”, “the cloud”, the “global village”, an “agora”, or even just the “space” of
“cyberspace” ’.51
Since the internet’s popularization, we have struggled to plug the behaviours
taking place on it into existing legal categories.52 ‘Hacking’ provides a good example. We have variously described hacking as involving identity ‘theft’, the ‘pirating’ of intellectual property,53 the release of ‘viruses’ that ‘infect’ computers and
servers, or as ‘cyberattacks’ auguring ‘cyberwars’ or ‘cyberconflict’. The underlying
conduct involved isn’t obviously distinguishable, but the labels tell very different
legal stories invoking very different legal regimes and tools: ordinary criminals
arrested by local police, public health crises requiring coordinated technical responses, or military threats and responses governed by the laws of armed conflict.
A search of articles over the last five years is revealing. When ‘cyberwar’ is
used in the title of an article, that article invariably applies law of armed conflict

Species: Collaboration Between Food and Agriculture Organization and the Cities Regime’ (2010) 11
Melbourne Journal of International Law 441.
49 The example is particularly pointed because it doubly requires metaphors—to describe the 0s and
1s transmitted through cables and to describe the operation of law upon them. See also Gore (n 19);
Blavin and Cohen (n 9) 267.
50 Molly Sauter, ‘Show Me on the Map Where They Hacked You: Cyberwar and the Geospatial
Internet Doctrine’ (2015) 47 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 63, 66.
51 ibid 64. On conceiving the internet as a physical ‘space’ see also Gore (n 149).
52 At the domestic level, questions abound about privacy, freedom of expression, and government
surveillance, among others, with fraught metaphors in tow—filing cabinets and desk drawers, books
and magazines, mail, telephone lines, public squares, etc.
53 Piracy is a particularly problematic metaphor in international law, whose meaning may shift with
shifting views of pirates. Pirates are common characters in popular culture and their image may invoke
cut-throat menace or a romantic outlawry. International law, built around the security of state authority,
has painted the pirate as the ultimate stateless threat—hosti humani generis. But the popular imagination may see something different, complicating the term’s use. The romantic image of the outlaw may
explain why to some, labelling file-sharing programmes like Napster as piracy may backfire.
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principles to its analysis. Articles using a ‘cyberattack’ in the title are more varied,
applying law of armed conflict principles about half of the time. In a similar vein,
Molly Sauter, found that the conceptual metaphor, ‘the Internet has real-world
geography’ dominated various official documents, including the Tallinn Manual,
and that with that metaphor came normative conclusions about nation-state control, competition, and contestation.54 ‘In the geographic metaphor, existing states
of conflict and interstate aggression can be seamlessly transferred into the online
space, along with existing state-determined structures of enemies and bad actors’55
and ‘In this interpretation of the metaphor the internet is quickly converted into
an additional operational zone of warfare, complete with familiar enemies and
allies.’56
Such case-studies highlight the stakes of these metaphors. The metaphors we use
to describe activity on the internet will dictate how we seek to regulate it. Whether
we see it as an ‘agora’, a space for protecting freedom of expression; a ‘marketplace’
in need of consumer protection; a ‘highway’ or ‘commons’ requiring regulatory cooperation;57 or an extension of national spaces threatened by external attacks, will
invariably dictate legal frameworks, the regulatory goals and responses, and the
responsible governing agencies. Perhaps proving the point, in attempting to argue
that it is the internet companies themselves that are the real threat, Shoshana Zuboff
proffers a range of new, alternative metaphors—surveillance, extractive mining
operations, conquistadors, telemetry and herds of animals, among others.58

C Metaphors as Narrative
The contest over legal frames suggests a third level at which metaphors operate
within international law. Each of the different metaphors in play in the cyber
context—agorae, marketplaces, surveillance, pirates, viruses, cyberattacks—brings
not only an off-the-shelf rulebook, but a set of normative commitments as well.
Each embodies a narrative of why regulation, and why specific types and forms of
regulation are warranted, valuable, and good. Metaphor acts as normative justification, a normative narrative undergirding the area of law.59
Such justificatory narratives may be embedded in legal categories. They may also
be implicit in the metaphors we used to describe the law itself. Describing states as
54

Sauter (n 50).
ibid 74.
56 ibid.
57 See Blavin and Cohen (n 9) 269–74 (discussing judicial decisions invoking the highway metaphor).
58 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New
Frontier of Power (PublicAffairs 2019).
59 For an example see Shiri Krebs’ thoughtful and incisive discussion of the role played by the ‘fog of
war’ metaphor in this volume: Shiri Krebs, ‘The Invisible Frames Affecting Wartime Investigations: Legal
Epistemology, Metaphors, and Cognitive Biases’ in this volume.
55
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persons may justify, explicitly or implicitly, rules that exclude other voices from negotiation or making claims or that disincentivize secession, like uti possidetis juris.
Describing custom in naturalistic terms may justify applying its rules to new, post-
colonial states that not only had no say in developing them, but may have been
their direct victims. But those justificatory metaphors can also exist outside the
four corners of the legal doctrine. These narratives help shape doctrines that might
otherwise be normatively neutral or contested, a collective justification for reading
the rules one way or another.
Policies and legal regimes depend on normative narratives.60 Shared narrative principles guide practitioners in their interpretation of that regime’s rules,
suggesting answers that better fit the goals or values that those rules are meant to
achieve.61 As such, shared normative narratives also support the coherence of the
rules in a particular regime,62 stringing them together as part of a logical whole.63
By providing coherence and distinguishing rules from arbitrary exercises of sovereign authority, these narratives also contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the
regime.64 Put another way, normative narratives present a type of political-moral
conventional wisdom. These narratives capture the basic, shared understanding of
why a policy is worthwhile. Alternatively, these narratives can help describe problems that need to be solved, challenges that must be met, to improve the law or
achieve the law’s goals.65

1 Marketplace of ideas
One such metaphor is the well-known ‘marketplace of ideas’. Originating in the
work of John Milton and John Stuart Mill,66 the metaphor provides a potent, vivid
justification for freedom of expression. Picked up by courts,67 commentators, and
the public, the metaphor suggests an efficient idea market, in which ideas are in
competition and in which the best ideas and the truth will eventually win more adherents. When applied to legal questions, the metaphor acts as an argument against
60 See Robert M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983)
97 Harvard Law Review 4.
61 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 254–58.
62 See Thomas M Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American Journal of
International Law 705, 712.
63 See Dworkin (n 61) 176–224.
64 See Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1964).
65 Anthea Roberts and Taylor St John have done an extraordinary job exploring such narratives regarding reform of investor–state dispute settlement. See Anthea Roberts and Taylor St John,
‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: In Sickness and In Health’ EJIL:Talk! (23 October 2019) https://
www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-in-sickness-and-in-health/ (accessed 7 May 2020). See
also Nicolas Lamp, ‘How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three
Narratives and Their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements’ (2019) 30
European Journal of International Law 1359.
66 See Stanley Ingber, ‘The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ (1984) 33 Duke Law
Journal 1, 3.
67 See eg Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, App no 16354/
06 (13 July 2012) (Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque).
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limitations of speech.68 More speakers, more ideas, will produce a better market
and a more informed public. Government censorship of speakers, no matter how
heinous, is likely to backfire. Of course, public speech does not look like an efficient
market; it is not, as the metaphor might suggest, entirely free. Structural considerations like wealth and power give some greater access, a louder voice, or perhaps
even control. And revealing truth is only one justification for freedom of expression. Protection of individual conscience and promotion of democratic participation serve as alternative justifications. Invocation of the marketplace of ideas and
everything associated with the metaphor can though crowd those other ideas out
and, in so doing, dictate specific legal answers over others.

2 Raising all boats/growing the pie
Ideas that free trade is a ‘rising tide that raises all boats’ or ‘grows the pie’ provide
another such set of justificatory narrative metaphors.69 Both of these metaphors
carry the accepted wisdom within economics that free trade makes all parties
better off. Protectionism, the narrative argues, is usually misguided. It may be
aimed at helping domestic workers, but it actually has the opposite effect, raising
prices, stifling growth, and shrinking the domestic economy.70 Trade liberalization, on the other hand, while perhaps causing transitional pain to domestic industries and workers, encourages growth and, through the magic of comparative
advantage, increases the overall welfare of all states, giving each more wealth to
allocate among its population.71 In this sense, free-er trade grows the global and
national pie and can make everyone better off. Free-er trade is a rising tide, raising
all national boats and all individuals in them.
These metaphors do not suggest that trade liberalization will in-and-of itself
better the lives or fortunes of everyone. But they do suggest that questions about
the redistribution of trade’s welfare gains are best and most efficiently answered
through domestic, rather than international, policy-making.72 Questions about
how to slice the pie should be secondary to questions about how to grow it.
These metaphors thus justify policies of trade liberalization and legal rules that
give them effect. But they go further, justifying a division of international trade from
68 See ibid. See also Observations of the United States of America on the Committee for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Thematic Discussion on ‘Racist Hate Speech’ https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/Discussions/Racisthatespeech/USA.pdf (accessed 26
May 2020) (‘The better course is to ensure that avenues of expression remain open—in order to expose,
contradict, and drown out hateful speech in a marketplace of ideas’).
69 See Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘What is International Trade Law For?’ (2019) 113 American Journal of
International Law 326.
70 See Robert Z Lawrence and Robert E Litan, ‘Why Protectionism Doesn’t Pay’ (1987) Harvard
Business Review 60, 61.
71 See Joost Pauwelyn, Andrew Guzman, and Jennifer Hillman (eds), International Trade Law (3rd
edn, Wolters Kluwer 2016) 11–19.
72 See Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory & Policy (7th edn,
Addison Wesley 2005) 214–17.
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other policy areas and a focus on liberalization over other potential negotiating
goals. They set up liberalization as the rule, and other policies—protection of
health, the environment, labour protections, for example—as exceptions, forcing
the latter to meet standards of necessity and non-discrimination. In blunt terms,
the metaphors explain why the current trade regime is good and what sorts of policies and rules would make it better.
But the metaphors are just metaphors. Trade agreements move forward at a variable pace, liberalizing some areas more or faster. Not all agreements do raise all
boats. Some boats may rise much faster, while others stagnate. Moreover, the division of trade from other areas of policy is entirely artificial. Once other interests
are considered alongside trade, the question of what goods are being maximized,
what pie is being grown, become much more questionable, much more fraught. In
this sense, these metaphors aren’t just justifications, animating the system, they are
silencers or blinders, obscuring the real policy tradeoffs involved in any negotiation behind poorly scrutinized ‘truths’ and aphorisms.

III Paradise or/and Prison
Metaphors are particularly important in describing law and its operation. Law is a
concept. It describes standards of behaviour accepted within and demanded by a
particular community of actors. It exists and exerts its force primarily in and upon
the minds of community members. It has no physical or tangible form until it is
applied or described. The words on the page of the law book, the court decision,
the foreign ministry statement, or the military manual are not the law, but mere
manifestations, interpretations. Nor are the arrests, the punishments, or the ordered compensation the law; they are merely reactions to it. This makes law and
its processes very difficult to describe. Operating upon our collective minds,
metaphors—analogies to tangible, visible things—become a necessity. And given
law’s collective character, setting expectations within some community, description and communication are necessary. The law must be transmitted from one
mind to others in order to operate.
We are always in the cave, and international law is always experienced as mere
shadows on its walls.73 But we are not merely passive observers. Seeking to understand the world outside, we develop more and more tools, lenses, to refract and
bend the light into visible forms. As we do so, we gain greater insight into how
international law works. The ever more refined lenses give us confidence that we

73 As Bianchi and Hirsch explain in their Introduction to this volume: ‘The point of departure is that
we do not directly sense information, as cognitive processes mediate between sensory input from the
environment and behaviour.’ Bianchi and Hirsch (n 4) 1: ‘The overarching idea is that there is no unmediated access to knowledge and that knowledge is mentally and socially constructed.’ ibid 6.
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are getting closer to describing the true international law. But we also lose sight
of how our perceptions are framed by our chosen lens—the world is not the light
refracted through the prism or the color-coded chart of microwave emissions, but
something far more massive and complex.
This is a well-known problem in the sciences.74 Metaphors developed to describe and organize complex processes are at first liberating—sparking creativity,
facilitating organized thinking, and suggesting routes of investigation. Darwin’s
metaphor of the tree of life, itself borrowed from other corners of the culture, became an intellectual superstructure guiding investigations of evolution and the
cataloguing of life-forms.75 But those metaphors can, over time, outlive their purpose, obscuring or bending findings that don’t fit the metaphors structure. As
mentioned above, the late 20th century discovery of horizontal gene transfer—the
inheritance of important DNA strands from bacteria and viruses—struggled to
reconcile itself with the tree metaphor.76 Scientists attempted to rethink the way
branches or roots were drawn, alluded to bushes rather than trees, all in an attempt
to uphold the metaphor in the face of conflicting evidence. The tree metaphor, once
such a potent tool for scientific progress, had become a hindrance, a confounding
distraction.
This gets at the complex duality inherent in metaphor’s role in international
law. Metaphor is creative, not only in the traditional, figurative sense, but in its
literal sense. Metaphors allow international lawyers to create an alternative image
of the world, one in which the chaos of everyday life is transformed into a more orderly model suitable for description, study, and organization. States are rendered
as persons, living in communities or society, sometimes trading with each other,
sometimes engaged in gladiatorial combat. Pirates, rogues, savages, and outlaws
threaten from the peripheries. International organizations—monsters, chimera,
and spirits—are conjured to help solve problems. Laws are mined or grown for sustenance, picked when ripe.
In this shared imaginary, metaphors can allow for creative leaps, opening up
ways of seeing the world previously obscured. They can also be a font of utopian
dreaming, allowing international lawyers to imagine a better world in which all the
pieces fit together in harmony.77
Over time, however, these metaphors can ossify. The stories they invoke become old, predictable, and clichéd. No longer novel, the stories become canon. We

74 See Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press
1970) 43–46.
75 See Quammen (n 2).
76 ibid. Cf Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 45 (using the difficulty taxonomizing the
platypus to highlight the difficulty categorizing investment treaties).
77 See also Wheatley (n 43) 764–65.
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become dull to the feats of imagination they involve, taking their metaphorical nature for granted. As Thomas Ross has observed:
Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he has been born—the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives
access to the accumulated records of other people’s experience, the victim insofar
as it ... bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for
data, his words for actual things.78

In other words, metaphors can be new and surprising, inspiring flights of imagination and a torrent of new ideas.79 But, they can, over time, become clichéd—
still evocative, but more numbing than exciting, suggesting images that are worn,
boring, taken for granted. When this happens, metaphors may actually work
against both imagination and logic, trapping us in a series of unthinking stories
and lulling us into believing their truth.80 The state is someone we know (isn’t it?);
the marketplace of ideas is a place we have visited (right?); we have ridden the
rising boats and enjoyed the growing pie (haven’t we?). As then Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals Benjamin Cardozo observed: ‘Metaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.’81
This is accentuated by the way in which metaphors help group communication.
As explained above, metaphors are potent ways to convey abstract ideas to others.
In a community setting, where sharing common ideas is important for establishing
group norms and solidarity, shared metaphors are essential. A shared repository
of metaphors allows quick and easy communication; good metaphors will create
a type of shared shorthand, conveying normative ideas and logical extensions far
faster than long-form discussions. They also help community members identify
one another in their use of a shared language, one that might not be obvious to
outsiders. International lawyers recognize each other in their invocation of legal
‘personality’ or ‘crystallizing’ rules. Given the transnational, trans-linguistic nature
78

Ross (n 12) 1053.
This imaginative power of metaphor is a particular focus of Del Mar (n 17) 173–82. Intriguingly,
using metaphors involves a whiff of danger. In invoking non-obvious images to describe something, the
author hopes that the listener will recognize the qualities in the metaphor they hope to convey. It is entirely possible though that the listener will recognize it, but be unimpressed, not recognize the reference
at all, or most dangerous, recognize the reference, but bring to it an entirely different set of emotions and
narratives. Successful metaphors build off deep wells of shared culture and, in that sense, both are the
product of and help construct international law’s communities of practice.
80 Eventually, some metaphors may die, their original meaning lost as they are repeated over and over
again. Language is full of such metaphors. When we ‘grasp’ an idea, we rarely imagine ourselves holding
it in our hands. Sports metaphors are emblematic of this process. ‘Arguing balls and strikes’ still evokes
baseball; ‘striking out’ in some endeavor may not; an ‘out of left field’ idea almost certainly does not.
‘Stepping into the ring’ may invoke boxing or wrestling; ‘standing in one’s corner’ or ‘throwing in the
towel’ or ‘going to the mat’ likely no longer does.
81 Berkey v Third Ave Ry Co, 155 NE 58, 61 (NY 1926).
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of international practice, this shared repertoire of images can be extraordinarily
important.
The shared metaphors also create a sense of mystique in belonging to a secret society replete with its own code words and secret handshakes.82 In that sense, these
shared metaphors act a bit like international law’s vestigial (or invented83) Latin
and French phrases—opinio juris, pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus, travaux
préparatoires. They imbue the practice, and skilled practitioners, with special
forms of social capital. But in fostering that group solidarity, these metaphors also
separate practitioners from others. International law practitioners in non-English
or non-French speaking countries may find themselves repeating metaphors with
little to no meaning in their native cultures.84 And those metaphors may create
barriers to entry. Mere obscurity to outsiders may keep others out; but in some
cases, the barriers may be actively defended by international lawyers unwilling to
give up their mystical tools.85 As Molly Sauter observes:
The existence of these discourse communities, essentially defined by their ability
to effectively speak to each other, makes effective discussion and consensus possible, while at the same time these groups are hampered, by their very nature,
from ever moving beyond the conceptual metaphors that tie them together.86

Ironically, then, focusing on international law’s metaphors reminds us of the
very human activity at the centre of the international law project. It reminds us
of the power of international lawyers to translate their imagination into power, to
create new physical realities through words—Abra Kadabrah. But it also reminds
us of the human frailty and weakness that keeps old ideas alive through groupthink, even as they have outlived their purpose or come to cause real harm.

82 One of the most venerable metaphors in international law is the ‘invisible college of international
lawyers’, the self-serving self-description of international law professionals as benevolent scientists
brought together across time and space to protect and propagate special world wisdom. See Oscar
Schacter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’ (1977) 72 Northwestern University Law Review
217, 217. For a comparison of international lawyers to rabbis see Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘The Primitive
Lawyer Speaks! Thoughts on the Concepts of International and Rabbinic Laws’ (2020) 64 Villanova Law
Review 665.
83 See Robert Kolb, ‘Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello’ (1997) 37 International Review
of the Red Cross 553.
84 As Maiko Meguro describes, ‘crystallization’ is used by international lawyers in Japan, but the term
otherwise only has scientific meaning. ‘Cyberattack’ is transliterated rather than translated. Situations
like these may put non-English, non-French speaking international lawyers in the complicated position
of being both insiders and outsiders within international law’s metaphorical community, as various
metaphors may be difficult to translate into their languages at all. Alonso Gurmendi mentions terms
like ‘Catch-22’, fighter, executing contracts, or treaties entering into force, as phrases with only imperfect Spanish counterparts.
85 See Bianchi and Hirsch (n 4) 4 (‘Power structures, epistemic forces and discursive policies—
influenced as they are by theories and theoretical discourse—determine what is deemed to be an acceptable and competent thing to say about international law’).
86 See eg Sauter (n 50) 66.
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It also recentres efforts at critique and reform. International law is reified
through its metaphors; shared metaphors are the ingredients from which international lawyers’ imaginary is conjured, the code on which their virtual world is
played. Critiquing doctrines may shift power within international law, but doing
so leaves its alternate reality intact. We might challenge and refine what constitutes an ‘armed attack’ in cyberspace, but as long as we invoke cyberwarfare as our
frame, our imagination and options will be limited by its terms. International law
has shed many of the explicitly colonial implications of state personality, but the
distortive effects of the basic metaphor remain. A return to the real world—a reset
of the code—must ultimately scrutinize the international law’s world-building
metaphors. The world of international law is brought into being through the ritual
incantations of metaphors by its lawyer-priests. Changing those incantations remakes that world.

